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 Over-consumption of foods and beverages high in fat, sugar and salt content, associated with heightened 
risk for obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs), is one of the biggest public health 
problems facing the UK.  
 It is not only a worry for people who suffer from limiting conditions such as diabetes, types of cancers, 
cardiovascular and coronary heart disease, but it is also worrying for all tax payers whose revenues go 
towards covering the costs of obesity and related NCDs to the NHS and the welfare system. 
 Increasing the price of unhealthy foods and beverages through taxes is a potential policy measure to 
discourage over-consumption. 
 This type of health-related food and beverage tax is already applied in Finland, France, Hungary, and 
Mexico.  
 Preliminary evidence from existing taxes on food and beverages suggests that these have been effective in 
reducing purchases, but the long-run impact on consumption and population health is yet to be evaluated.   
 The debate on such taxes in the UK is ongoing. Several organisations have called for a 20% or 20p per litre 
tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) while both Conservative and Labour party representatives stated 
in 2014 no intentions of introducing a tax on SSBs or sugar.  
 The food industry remains firm that taxes are unnecessary and numerous companies have pledged to 
compromise with voluntary agreements such as restricting food marketing to children, reformulating 
products, modifying food labels and promoting healthy eating guidelines.  
 The effectiveness of the tax in reducing consumption of unhealthy foods and beverages depends on its 
design. If tax rates are low, the tax base narrowly specified and taxes are levied upon products that are 
relatively cheap, the impact will be small.  
 A higher tax rate, combined with gradual increases, and a broader tax base will result in a larger impact on 
consumption and has thus greater potential to influence health.  However, proposals for such taxes are 
also likely to face even greater opposition from the food and beverage industry. 
 Taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages alone will not solve nutrition-related health problems. However, 
if well designed and communicated, in combination with other relevant policy measures, taxes can 
contribute to improved population health. 
 If taxes are to be pursued to fight obesity and non-communicable diseases, it is necessary that other 
regulatory measures and novel voluntary actions by food producers and food retailers continue to be 
developed and implemented.   
 
1.  Why are food and beverage taxes of interest to civil society? 
The main reason talks have emerged on introducing specific food and beverage 
taxes is because of public health concerns. Over-consumption of energy dense foods 
high in fat and sugar, and sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB), is related to obesity 
and increased prevalence of type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease (CHD), other 
cardiovascular diseases (CVD), several cancers and other NCDs (3-8).  Furthermore, 
consumption of sugary foods and drinks is the primary cause of tooth decay. Taxes 
can be used to make unhealthy food more expensive relative to healthy foods and 
thereby incentivise healthier food consumption behaviour. 
                                                             
1
 Research Fellow at London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), funded by the 
MRC UK Fellowship in Economics of Health (ref MR/L012324/1) 
2
 PhD student, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) 
  
2 Health-related taxes on food and beverages 
Secondly, food taxes affect food prices, which matter for consumers, particularly 
low-income earners who spend a greater share of their disposable income on foods. 
Policies that lower the price of foods are understandably popular while food taxes, 
to the contrary, are unpopular because of their regressive nature. Food taxes are 
considered to be regressive because low-income earners pay relatively larger share 
of their disposable income on such taxes. However, those in lower socio-economic 
groups purchase a greater share of energy from less healthy foods and beverages 
than those in higher socio-economic groups (9) which places them at a greater risk 
of obesity and ill-health. This is at least partly due to the higher relative price of 
foods such as fruits and vegetables and lower relative price of unhealthy foods such 
as confectionery, soft drinks, snacks, fast food, breakfast cereals and convenience 
foods (10, 11).   
Thirdly, taxes are a common measure to internalise the cost of negative 
externalities. Negative externalities are, by definition, private actions that impose 
costs on society. Food is associated with two types of externalities. First, obesity, if 
triggered by over-consumption of foods, imposes costs on society through higher 
medical costs, loss of productivity, absenteeism and subsequently, welfare 
payments. Second, unsustainable food production, focusing on quantity of food 
production, has a significant negative impact on the environment (12).  
Raising government revenue through taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages can 
provide means to reduce the additional cost imposed on the society from its 
consumption, and to address the regressive nature of the tax by providing subsidies 
on healthy foods. While taxes on very specific food or beverage products are not 
expected to yield large tax contributions relative to other sources of tax revenue, 
the potential of the taxes to raise additional revenue has been used alongside the 
public health argument in the debates on the implementation of the majority of 
existing food and beverage taxes (e.g. Finland, Hungary, Denmark and France). 
2.  Background 
2.1  Nutrition related health in the UK 
In 2011, 62% of the UK population was obese or overweight
3
. A quarter of men 
(24%) and women (26%) were obese, and a further 42% of men and 32% of women 
were overweight. Obesity prevalence is highest among 45-74 year olds, both men 
and women. Among children aged 2-15, 17% of boys and 26% of girls were obese 
with a further 31% of boys and 28% of girls overweight.  While the rate of growth in 
obesity prevalence among adults has slowed down, the levels in 2011 were still the 
highest recorded. For children there was a decline in obesity levels in the mid-2000’s 
but since then the trend has mostly flattened out with only a small reduction 
continuing in the prevalence of overweight girls (13). The most recent projections by 
the WHO show that by 2030, 74% of men and 64% of women in the UK will be 
overweight, including 33% of women and 36% of men who will be obese (14).  
Among women and children, overweight, and particularly obesity prevalence, varies 
by income group with the highest prevalence rates reported among the population 
of the lowest income quintile  (13). Furthermore, a strong relationship exists 
between levels of deprivation and obesity among women and children
4
. Those in 
the lower deprivation quintiles are more likely to be obese and overweight in 
comparison to those in higher quintiles (13). For men, the difference in the 
prevalence of obesity among highest and lowest income earners is small, while the 
prevalence of overweight is higher among high income earners (13). 
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Being overweight or obese is the main risk factor for developing type 2 diabetes. 
According to Public Health England, obese adults are five times more likely to be 
diagnosed with diabetes in comparison to adults at a healthy weight (15). People 
with type 2 diabetes have an increased risk of developing other associated 
comorbidities such as cardiovascular diseases (CVD), kidney failure, and blindness 
(16-18).  Recent estimates from the US show that persons with obesity die up to 8 
years earlier than non-obese persons, mainly caused by associated diseases such as 
type 2 diabetes, dyslipidaemias and hypertension causing strokes and other 
coronary heart diseases (CHD) and cardiac events (19). 
High consumption of saturated fat is associated with raised blood cholesterol which 
together with low consumption of fruits and vegetables and high consumption of 
salt are among the main risk factors for CHD (6). In the UK, CHD is the leading cause 
of death with 1 in 6 men and 1 in 10 women dying of the disease (20). High 
consumption of salt is further related to high blood pressure (hypertension) and 
stroke (6). High blood pressure affects approximately 1 in 3 adults in the UK and is 
one of the leading causes of CVD (13). High consumption of SSBs is associated with 
increased body mass index and with diabetes mellitus (6, 21) and together with 
sugary food consumption is linked to tooth decay, affecting 31% of adults and 28% 
of five year old children in England (22). Furthermore, dental extraction is the major 
cause of general anaesthesia in young children, affecting particularly children from 
deprived households and certain ethnic minority groups (22). At an extreme it can 
cause malnutrition for both children and adults and significantly reduce quality of 
life due to pain and discomfort. (22) 
2.2  Estimated costs of obesity and nutrition related health in the UK 
Health problems associated with being overweight or obese cost the NHS more than 
£5 billion every year (23, 24). Medical costs of an obese person are estimated to be 
50-80% higher in comparison to an individual in normal weight (25, 26). 
In addition to direct medical cost, society faces costs from absenteeism associated 
with obesity which in 2002 was estimated at 15.5-16 million days per year (24). It 
has also been estimated that obese people are up to 25% less likely to be in 
employment in comparison to people in healthy weight, with this effect being larger 
for women (27). Estimates of such indirect costs over the period 1998 to 2007 
ranged between £2.6 billion (28) and £15.8 billion (29). Modelled projections 
suggest that indirect costs could be as much as £27 billion in 2015 (29). 
According to most recent estimates, the total cost of obesity in the UK was £47 
billion in 2012 - a figure second only to smoking. This estimate of the total societal 
cost includes the cost of health care, lost productivity due to disability and 
premature death, and direct investment in mitigation strategies (26).   
By disease categories, the total cost (direct care and indirect costs) associated with 
diabetes in the UK was £23.7 billion in 2012 and is predicted to rise to £39.8 billion 
by 2035 (30). Combined costs of care, mortality and morbidity from CVD was 
£13.4bn in 2014, estimated to rise to £24 billion by 2020 (31). Dental treatment is 
equally costly. The NHS spends around £3.4 billion on dental treatment every year 
(32).   
 
3.  Food consumption and food price trends 
There are many argued causes for the rising levels of obesity. Among these, some 
environmental conditions have contributed, such as modified food consumption 
patterns, increase sedentary life-styles, increase of availability of processed and high 
energy foods, physical access to these foods and changes in food prices. 
Analysis of consumer food expenditure data since the 1980’s, by the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies (IFS), showed a reduction in the amount of calories eaten at home and 
an increase in the calories eaten outside the home, from snacks, soft drinks and 
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confectionery (33). The price per calorie consumed has fallen, indicating a 
substitution towards cheaper sources of calories, particularly following the financial 
crisis of 2008 (34). Other sources similarly suggest that foods have become more 
calorie dense but cheaper, and that portion size of packaged foods and meals in 
restaurants has also increased (35). 
Another change that has occurred in the past couple of decades affecting diets is a 
decrease in the time spent on preparing foods. This has fallen from 60 minutes as 
the average time to prepare a meal in 1980 to 34 minutes in 2014 (36, 37). This also 
suggests greater reliance on pre- prepared foods, ready to eat meals and eating out 
of the home. 
While the food expenditure data show that health consciousness in food 
consumption decisions has increased (36) it is not always clear to consumers what 
foods are healthy or unhealthy and how much should be consumed or in fact is 
consumed. Based on a panel of nearly 30,000 British households, 36% believe they 
consume five portions of fruit and vegetables per day as recommended by the 
Government for a healthy diet but in reality only 11% of households achieve this 
(36). The National Diet and Nutrition Survey reports higher figures than the food 
expenditure data, with 31% of adults and 37% of children eating five portions of 
fruit and vegetables in a day, but even at this level, still significantly less than half of 
the population achieve the five a day target (38). IFS analyses also report that 
population buying practices have had  a substantial shift away from fruit and 
vegetable consumption towards purchases of processed foods (34).  
Awareness of the harmfulness of saturated fats has dominated the food sector and 
reformulation efforts in the past decade. Sugar has been used to replace fats 
meaning that many foods labelled as “healthy” due to their low-fat content now 
contain higher levels of sugar and contribute to rising obesity prevalence (39).  
3.1  Food prices 
Food prices act as signals for consumers and have an important role in purchasing 
decisions. A recent policy brief by the Food Research Collaboration on food prices in 
the UK shows the trend of Consumer Price Indices (CPI) (40). Since 2005 the price of 
foods bought for consumption at home has on average grown by 30%. The category 
of ‘other food’ which encompasses ready cooked meals has seen the smallest 
increase in price (22%) while the price of fruits and vegetables, for example, grew 
considerably more (31%). In comparison, the price of food bought for consumption 
outside the home (restaurants, cafes, catering), including alcoholic beverages, grew 
also at a slower rate of 23% (41). The CPI of unprocessed foods grew by 31% 
whereas the CPI of processed foods (including non-alcoholic beverages) grew at the 
slightly lower rate of 29%.  
Recent academic research focusing on the price of unhealthy foods and cost of diets 
also shows that the healthiest diets cost double the price of the least healthy diet 
(42). The price of unhealthy foods has been shown to be decreasing over time and, 
importantly, the gap between the price of healthy and unhealthy foods is widening 
(10, 11).  
Price promotions are also becoming more common at supermarkets. Kantar data on 
consumer expenditure shows that foods bought on price promotion account for 
37% calories, 34% of sugar and 39% of saturated fats (37).  Academic research 
shows that, contrary to common belief, overall healthy and non-healthy foods (high 
in salt, sugar and fat) are promoted similarly, regardless of their attributes regarding 
health.  Nonetheless, the increase in sales due to price promotions is larger in the 
less healthy food categories than in healthier food categories (43).  
3.2  Food purchasing trends across socio-economic groups  
Table 1 shows the average annual expenditure share (%) of foods purchased by 
socio-economic groups in the UK in 2013. The largest differences between the 
highest two (A&B) and lowest two (D&E) groups illustrate the inequalities that exist 
in food purchasing patterns. Groups A&B spend more on fruits and vegetables while 
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groups D&E spend relatively more on both sweets, soft drinks, and ‘other’ category, 
which largely consists of convenience, pre-prepared frozen and canned foods. 
Table 1: Average annual expenditure share of foods and beverages, 2013 
Other research on food consumption by socio economic groups has also shown that 
lower socio-economic groups generally purchase a greater proportion of energy 
from less healthy foods and beverages while higher socio-economic groups 
purchase a greater proportion of energy from healthier foods and beverages (9). 
Analysing food expenditure data by different family compositions, IFS analyses 
reported that since the economic recession in 2008, couples with young children, 
lone parent households and pensioner households have seen the largest declines in 
the nutritional quality of their purchases, mostly driven by a switch to processed 
foods compared with other household types. As a result, the average saturated fat 
and sugar content of food purchases in these groups has increased over this period 
(34). 
 
4.  Food taxes in the UK  
There are three types of taxes that can affect the price of food and beverages: the 
value added tax, import tariffs and excise duties. Value Added Tax (VAT) is paid as a 
% of the value of all food or beverages sold; import tariffs apply to foods or 
beverages that are imported from outside the European Union (EU); and excise 
duties may be levied upon goods that in a health context carry negative externalities 
such as tobacco or alcohol. Currently there are no excise duties on foods in the UK.  
4.1  Value added tax  
Most foods and non-alcoholic beverages in the UK are taxed either at reduced 0% or 
standard rate (20%) VAT. The 0% VAT applies to raw meat and fish, fruits and 
vegetables, cereals, nuts and pulses, herbs, bread and bread products and cold take-
away foods. The 20% rate applies to hot take-away foods, ice cream, confectionery, 
juice and juice drinks, carbonated drinks, potato crisps and savoury snack products, 
cereal and muesli bars, fruit bars, flavoured rice cakes and savoury popcorn. While 
the standard rate applies to less healthy foods, there are still plenty of products that 
are high in sugar, fat and/or salt that are taxed at a reduced rate, such as cakes, 
flapjacks, chocolate for home-baking, sugary breakfast cereals or processed meat 
and cold take-away foods. 
4.2  Trade tariffs and restrictions 
Import tariffs on foods from non-EU countries are set via the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the EU and vary according to foods and country of origin. The rate of 
 Average annual expenditure share (%)   
 A&B C D&E 
Bread, pasta, rice, breakfast cereal 11.0 11.1 11.5 
Meat and fish 15.3 15.2 14.5 
Dairy 13.9 13.5 13.4 
Fruits and vegetables 15.9 14.2 12.4 
Juice, juice drinks, flavoured milk 1.5 1.2 1.0 
Soft drinks 4.6 4.9 5.3 
Sweets (confectionery, biscuits) 8.4 9.2 10.3 
Other* 29.4 30.8 31.6 
Source: Kantar Worldpanel UK, author calculations 
*Other: convenience foods, frozen prepared foods, canned goods, savoury home cooking (e.g. 
oils, sauces, meal kits, curry paste), crisps, pop-corn, slimming products, hot beverages, pickles, 
table sauces, condiments. 
 
 
  
6 Health-related taxes on food and beverages 
the tariffs depends on trade agreements between the EU and individual countries or 
groups of countries. The purpose of these tariffs is to ensure that EU produce is 
competitive in the EU market. Overall, tariffs range from 5% to 20% of the value of 
the food (44, 45). 
The fruit and vegetable market within the EU is further protected by an entry price 
system. If the price of the imported produce falls below a set reference price it is 
subject to both tariff and an ad valorem duty while if it is at or above the reference 
price, it is subject to ad valorem duty only (45, 46). This system protects local fruit 
and vegetable producers but at the same time keeps the price of fruit and 
vegetables at potentially higher levels in comparison to world market prices.  
Trade statistics, collected by DEFRA, show that the quantity of imports subject to 
potential tariffs varies significantly by food groups. For example, 33% of fruit and 
vegetable products  are imported to the UK from outside the EU while only 0.7% of 
dairy and egg products, and 18% of meat and meat preparations, are imported from 
outside the EU(47). The overall impact of such trade restrictions on the prices of 
healthy and unhealthy foods (or health) has not been evaluated, but these figures 
do imply that the price of fruit and vegetables could be lower if such restrictions and 
tariffs were not in place.  
In addition, sugar sector reforms proposed in the CAP may have significant effects 
on the price of sugar in the near future. DEFRA estimates that changes to sugar 
policy regarding sugar imports from non-EU countries are likely to reduce the price 
of sugar by 20-35% (48). Even though these reforms will not be implemented until 
2017 it is clear it would undermine any tax on sugar or sugary beverages. While the 
aim of the sugar policy is to make the agricultural sector more competitive, a 
consequence of reducing the price of sugar is contrary to the recommendations of 
global nutrition and health policies (49). 
 
5.  Health related food taxes   
5.1  Design of health related food tax 
The main consideration when designing health related food taxes is the scope (base) 
of tax. Distinction can be made between taxes on individual products and taxes on 
ingredients. For example, the tax could be imposed on drinks with added sugars or it 
could be imposed on sugar as an ingredient. Between the two options there is a 
trade-off between the ease of implementation, administration, and its effectiveness. 
Imposing a tax on specific products (e.g. SSB) is easier to determine and administer 
but, because there will be alternatives that are not taxed but still high in sugar 
content, substitution to untaxed products will be likely (e.g. natural juices or sweets 
in general). Conversely, taxing added sugar as an ingredient will have a significant 
administrative burden as it affects a large range of products, but its effect will be 
larger as substitutions are less likely to occur because the price of all products 
containing sugar increases (50).  
The next consideration is the type of tax to be imposed. In this context the 
discussion is generally between increasing the rate of an existing VAT and 
introducing an excise duty that can be in addition to an existing VAT on the product. 
VAT is proportional to the price of the product meaning that the value of the tax is 
smaller if the price of the product is lower. Excise duty is typically a ‘per unit’ tax, 
costing a specific amount per volume or unit of the item purchased. This type of tax 
is commonly used to raise government revenue and is levied upon goods for which 
demand is relatively less responsive to price changes and for which few substitutes 
exist. For example, tobacco, fuel and alcohol are all taxed via excise duty in addition 
to VAT. Excise duty is also argued to correct negative externalities (i.e. harm caused 
by consumption on third parties).  
Excise duty is by definition likely to have a larger impact on consumption as it is 
imposed on a unit of product (e.g. per litre of SSB) and at the same rate regardless 
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of its price (e.g. branded and non-branded drinks would be taxed equally). As the 
VAT is levied based on the product price, it incentivises purchases of larger 
quantities (e.g. price per litre is lower for 1L bottle in comparison to 0.33L bottle). 
Both types of taxes are regressive but taxes based on volume of consumption, 
rather than value, have been shown to have a lower tax burden (51). 
Finally, it has to be considered whether the tax rate will change over time. The 
advantage of the VAT based tax is that it is already linked to inflation. Excise duty, 
linked to unit of consumption, has to be indexed to inflation as otherwise it will 
become less significant as prices rise. Furthermore, excise duty can be introduced 
gradually, meaning that the tax rate is set to increase by increments for a number of 
years, a policy that has been applied to tobacco and alcohol products. Gradual 
implementation of the duty allows time for consumers to change their habits and 
soften the impact on households and businesses.  
5.2  Health related food taxes introduced in other countries 
Table 2 summarises health related food taxes introduced in a number of countries. 
The arguments for implementation for each of these taxes has been a combination 
of addressing rising obesity and NCD prevalence and increasing revenue for 
government (1).
5,6 
Finland is the only country where revenue collection is reported 
as the primary objective (1).  
All taxes implemented are excise duties with the exception of Mexico where the VAT 
rate was raised for unhealthy foods. Hungary and Mexico have taxes on foods high 
in salt, sugar or fat content and sugary drinks/soft drinks/drinks with added sugar. 
Finland has a tax on sweets, ice-cream and soft drinks, and France and Berkley 
(California, USA) have taxed only soft drinks.  
In a few examples the opposition to already implemented taxes has been successful 
in removing or limiting the taxes. Denmark introduced a tax on saturated fats in 
2011 but due to its unpopularity among many actors, little political support, and 
alleged negative effects on the industry, the tax was repealed shortly before its first 
anniversary (52).  The Finnish government rescinded a planned tax increment for 
2015 in the sweets tax due to a complaint filed with the European Commission by 
the Finnish Food and Drinks Industries Federation calling into question the 
lawfulness of the tax
7
, which has reportedly hindered the government in expanding 
the scope of the tax (53).  
Rates of the implemented taxes vary across countries. Hungary has the lowest tax 
rate on soft drinks and Finland has the highest (and progressive) tax rates. Tax 
revenues therefore vary but are also affected by the scope of the tax base (e.g. in 
France the tax also covers SSBs with artificial sweeteners) and consumption and 
price levels in each of the countries. In absolute levels, the tax in Mexico has yielded 
the highest revenue which also exceeded expectations by 116% (54). 
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 Taxes on food and beverages, implemented for health reasons, can also be found in 
Mauritius, French Polynesia, Tonga and Samoa. For more details on these taxes see 
http://www.wcrf.org/int/policy/nourishing-framework/use-economic-tools  
6
 Few excise taxes on foods have existed before. Denmark, for example, has taxed ice cream 
since 1946, soft drink and juice since the 1930s and sweets (since 1968). Finland had an 
excise duty on sweets from 1926 to 2010. 
7
 Case refers to the unfair tax base as cookies and other bakery products are exempt from the 
tax while often referred as similar products to sweets and confectionery 
(http://www.etl.fi/www/fi/lausunnot/kannanotot/State_Aid_Complaint_Excise_Duty_in_Fi
nland.pdf) 
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Table 2. Health related food taxes implemented 
Country Year What are taxed Rate of tax Type of tax and 
reasoning 
Revenues raised 
Hungary 
 
2011 Foods high in sugar, 
fat or salt and 
sugary drinks  
Soft drinks: ~£0.02per/L  
Syrups or concentrates: ~£0.5 per/L  
Energy drinks: ~£0.64 per/L  
Pre-packaged sugary products: 
~£0.33 per/kg   
Salty snacks (salt > 1g/100g):~£0.64 
per/kg 
Jam: ~£1.28 per/kg   
Excise; public 
health/revenue 
for health services 
2011:~£8m 
2012: ~£47m 
2013: ~£46m 
Denmark 
 
2011  
(aboli-
shed in 
Jan 
2013)  
Products with more 
than 2.3% of 
saturated fat (meat, 
dairy, animal fats 
and oils) 
Saturated fat: ~£1.76 per/kg   Excise; public 
health/finance tax 
cuts elsewhere 
~£115m;  
Estimated 
administrative cost 
~£5-19m 
 
France 
 
2012 Drinks containing 
added sugar or 
sweetener 
Sugared and non-sweetened drinks: 
2012: ~£0.057 per/L  
2013: ~£0.058 per/L 
2014: ~£0.059 per/L 
Energy drinks: ~£0.79 per/L 
Excise, adjusted 
annually to 
inflation;  
public health and 
revenue 
£268m 
Finland 
 
2011 Sweets, ice cream 
and soft drinks 
Soft drinks; sweets and ice-cream 
2011: ~£0.06 per/L; ~£0.6 per/kg  
2012: ~£0.09 per/L; ~£0.75 per kg  
2014: ~£0.17 per/L, ~£0.75 per/kg  
Excise with 
gradual increase; 
revenue collection 
/public health 
2011: £95m 
2012: £129m 
2013: £144m 
 
Mexico 
 
2014 Sugary drinks and 
high-calorie foods 
(e.g. chips, sweets, 
breakfast cereals) 
Sugary drinks: £0.04 per/L  
High-calorie foods: 8% increase in 
VAT 
Excise/VAT; health 
(55) 
2014: ~£1,252m 
(58% tax from sodas 
and 42% from high 
caloric foods).(54) 
 
US, 
California, 
Berkley 
2014 Sugar-sweetened 
beverages 
~£0.24 per/L  (56) Excise; 
health 
No data yet 
Source: (1, 2) unless stated otherwise. Ecorys report analysis based on Euromonitor Passport Database 
 
 
5.3  Policy debate in the UK on health related food taxes 
 
Position of NGO’s and medical associations in the UK 
Over the past two years several NGO’s and medical associations have actively 
advocated the introduction of a tax on SSBs to curb their consumption as they 
contribute towards higher bodyweight and oral health problems while providing no 
nutritional value.  Support for a 20p per litre tax on SSBs and subsequent earmarking 
of revenues for programs to improve (children’s) health and food environments 
have been publicly announced via statements and reports by: 
• Children’s Food Campaign in December 2014  
• The Faculty of Public Health in November 2013 
• Academy of Medical Royal Colleges in February 2013 
• Sustain, including support from 61 organisations in January 2013 
 
Calls for a tax on SSB in a form of an excise duty have also been made by: 
• Action on Sugar in their manifesto for 2015 (published October 2014) 
• UK Health Forum (previously National Heart Forum) in June 2012 
 
Politicians’ response 
Thus far, the response from politicians to calls to introduce a tax on SSBs has not 
been positive. Although in March 2014 the Government Chief Medical Officer, Dame 
Sally Davies, told a committee of MPs that a tax on sugar may be necessary as it was 
unlikely the industry will voluntarily reformulate products to contain less sugar, 
Health Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, announced in June 2014 that the government did 
not have any plans to introduce taxes on sugar or sugary drinks (57). This statement 
was echoed by Labour Shadow Health Minister, Luciana Berger, a month later, in 
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July 2014 (58).  The government Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN) 
did however at the same time issue draft recommendations to the public to reduce 
sugar intake to account for 5% of daily calories, reduced from 10% in previous 
recommendations, in the light of similar recommendation made by the WHO in 
March 2014 (21, 59, 60).  
Industry position and the Responsibility Deal 
The food and beverage industry does not support taxes and insists on the 
effectiveness of voluntary actions (61). This is largely done under the umbrella of 
the Responsibility Deal, launched in 2011 and led by the Department of Health (62). 
Companies sign up to voluntary pledges, focusing on different areas but not all of 
these have specific targets.  For example, the ‘calorie reduction pledge’ aims to 
reduce the number of calories in the UK daily food supply by 5 billion through 
changes in formulation, package size, new low-calorie alternatives and consumer 
education. The pledge currently has 43 signatories listed
8
.  In comparison, the 
pledge on ‘saturated fat reduction’ and the pledge to increase ‘fruit and vegetable 
intake’ have less specific targets and so far have 18 and 48 signatories, respectively. 
Once signed up to the pledge, companies have to provide a delivery plan that sets 
out how they will meet the pledge objectives and annually report back on progress. 
Recently published analysis of these reports concludes that some of the actions 
undertaken could be effective in improving population health (e.g. reformulation to 
remove saturated fats) but the majority favoured information provision, awareness 
raising and communication with consumers, which has been shown to have a 
limited effect on health(63).  No specific objectives were found regarding reduction 
in sugar consumption and pricing policies were only mentioned under the fruit and 
vegetable pledge. Furthermore, the evaluation found that most interventions were 
clearly or possibly already underway regardless of the Responsibility Deal (63). 
Elsewhere, concerns have also been expressed on whether the Responsibility Deal 
could achieve a reduction in sugar consumption and continue the progress made in 
reducing salt consumption due to a lack of clear targets (64, 65).  
Even though voluntary reformulation has led to successes in reducing the amount of 
salt in foods in the past decade (66, 67) it is unclear whether this can be repeated 
for calories or, more specifically, sugar in pre-prepared foods and beverages 
because of more complicated needs in reformulation processes. Sugar not only 
provides sweetness but also is an important factor in volume, texture, viscosity and 
preservation of foods (68). Also, it remains to be seen whether the voluntary steps 
taken have and will be significant enough to impact health outcomes.  
Public opinion 
Another important factor is public support to taxing unhealthy foods and beverages. 
This aspect has received relatively little attention from academics. Timpson and 
Lavin (2014) analysed attitudes towards a tax on sugary drinks among 293 
respondents from Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and 
Merseyside (69). Of the respondents 76.2% reported drinking sugary drinks and 
most of the adult participants of the study described doing so as ‘out of habit’. Many 
participants viewed sugary drinks as a source of energy but few linked it to weight 
gain or a high amount of calories. The majority however were aware of the negative 
effect of drinking sugary drinks on dental health. Adults reported that price affects 
their decisions to consume sugary drinks and reported buying sugary drinks on offer, 
or when it is part of a meal deal. Children and young people, on the other hand, 
bought a sugary drink if they wanted one, provided they had money for it, 
regardless of the price. Generally, the respondents found tax on sugary drinks 
acceptable but thought 20% would not be enough to impact consumption.  
Although a small study, it brings up relevant points: a) sugary drink consumption is 
more likely to be habitual rather than a rational choice; b) children and young 
people might be less responsive to price changes (provided they have the money to 
buy the drink) as they buy small quantities at a time and do not think about budgets 
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or providing a meal when making decisions
9
 , and c) adults buy sugary drinks in 
larger quantities at a time for the family, together with other food items, and do so 
often due to offers or deals and hence are likely to be more responsive to changes 
in prices.  
Mazzocchi et al. (2014) looked at attitudes towards healthy eating policies more 
broadly in five European countries, including in the UK (sample n=603) (70). The 
British population considered a price subsidy for healthy foods (72% agree or 
strongly agree to the policy statement), followed by VAT reflecting healthiness of 
foods (67%) and subsidies for low-income families (62%) as the most popular among 
policies that affect the price of food. The least popular was a ‘fat tax’ to fund healthy 
eating policies (47%).  
The study also measured willingness to pay (WTP) for healthy eating policies. When 
asked to allocate €150 of a tax increase between healthy eating policies, other 
policy actions to promote health, housing, security, transportation and the 
environment, the UK sample on average allocated €17 to healthy eating policies. 
However when asked how much they would be willing to pay in more taxes, the 
total net WTP amounted to €-11 signalling that while the public would support the 
healthy eating policies they are not individually willing to pay for these through 
higher taxes and to the contrary would prefer to see a tax reduction. Of the five 
countries studied, Denmark was the only country where the total WTP for healthy 
eating policies was positive (€14). 
Authors also reported that fiscal policies were more likely to be supported by those 
who believe obesity is attributed to food supply factors
10
 , and whose political views 
are more to the left, relative to centre. Those who consume fast-food and pre-
packaged meals are predictably less likely to support fiscal policies. Those who 
thought obesity is attributed to individual failure, economic constraints or genetics 
were found to not have higher levels of support towards any of the policy options.  
Emm et al. (2013) surveyed 188 respondents from South England and found greater 
support shown towards redistributive policies (e.g. funding fruit and vegetables at 
schools, subsidising exercise and education programs) in comparison to policies that 
raise the price of foods 
11
(71).  Similarly to other findings, a comparison of public 
acceptability of increased taxation and education campaigns to choice architecture 
(i.e. nudging) interventions
12
, found that the UK population accepted education 
campaigns the most (~80% of the sample).  Choice architecture interventions were 
found acceptable by more than half of the sample (~50-65%) and increasing taxes 
was the least accepted (~40% of the sample) intervention (72). 
 
6.  Impact of health related food taxes    
To evaluate the effectiveness of the taxes, the targeted outcome against which it is 
evaluated against needs to be made clear. Immediate response is generally 
measured by the reduction of consumption or the reduction in expenditure on 
taxed products and the tax revenue collected. Reports and studies on the impact of 
existing food and beverage taxes is mounting. However, to measure any resulting 
changes in health outcomes (e.g. BMI, obesity prevalence, NCD prevalence, life 
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 The study cites research showing that habitual patterns develop at an early age suggesting 
that young people and children should be the target group for the policy to prevent 
consumption in adulthood. 
10
 This group supported all policies towards healthy eating with strongest support shown 
towards access and content of foods, followed by fiscal measures and advertising bans.  
11
 Mean score of 4.79 (95%CI 4.63, 4.94) (scale 1 to 7) was attributed to redistributive policies 
versus 3.81 (95%CI 3.58, 4.04) to price raising policies. 
12
 Limiting the size of products sold, changing the shape of products sold, and changing the 
location of foods in shops. 
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years gained) that allow for inferring causality between taxes and changes in health, 
longer-run evaluations with appropriate study designs are needed.  
As the tax is generally levied upon the producer or the seller, the impact depends 
also on whether or not the tax is passed through to consumers. Taxes can be passed 
on fully, be over-shifted or under-shifted. Over-shifting is likely to occur when the 
demand for taxed foods or beverages is inelastic (i.e. less price responsive) and has 
been, for example, observed in the case of alcohol taxes. It has also been found that 
under-shifting is likely to occur for cheaper products and over-shifting for more 
expensive products as the price responsiveness varies depending on the price of the 
product (73). Prospective modelling studies generally assume that the tax is fully 
passed on to the consumers. 
6.1  International evidence on the effectiveness of taxes 
The most comprehensive study of the impact of the existing taxes in Europe, based 
on data from Euromonitor Passport Database, found an expected reduction in 
consumption (purchases) resulting from price increases due to the taxes (see tables 
3 and 4). For soft drinks/SSB, the tax has resulted in an increase in the price by 3-
10% and a reduction in consumption by 4-10% in all four countries.  Evidence 
indicated over-shifting of the tax mostly in Finland but also to a small extent in 
France and Hungary (2). In the European countries no evidence was found of a 
significant impact on other competitiveness indicators investigated (retail margin, 
retail share, employment, productivity, economic value added, investment and 
trade).    
Table 3 Impact of taxes on price and consumption of soft drinks 
Country Impact 
Finland (soft 
drinks)  
 Price increased by 7.3% in 2011, by 7.3% in 2012, and by 2.7% in 2013, while the tax was expected 
to increase the price by 1.5% and 0.9% in 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
 Price increases led to a reduction in demand by 0.7% in 2011, by 3.1% in 2012 and by 0.9% in 
2013. 
 Almost no change in the trends in competitiveness indicators. Some effects on labour productivity 
and employment in the industry linked to reduction in demand. Difficult to separate the impact of 
taxes on alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks.  
France (regular 
Cola)  
 Price increased by 5% in 2012 and by 3.1% in 2013 while the tax itself was expected to increase 
price by 4.5% in 2012. Increase in the price in 2013 was very large given tax rate was only adjusted 
to inflation. 
 Demand reduced by 3.3% in 2012 and 3.4% in 2013. 
 Retail margins increase for diet cola, no change for regular cola. 
 Based on available data no changes in the indicators for competitiveness were noted. 
Hungary (Cola)   Price increased by 3.4% in 2011, 1.2% in 2012 and 0.7% in 2013 while tax alone was expected to 
raise price by 3.1% in 2011. 
 Demand reduced by 2.7% in 2011, by 7.5% in 2012 and by 6% in 2013. 
 Some evidence of substitution towards non-branded products. 
 Increases in competitiveness indicators but unclear how much, if any, can be contributed to the 
tax. 
 Retailer margins increased. 
Mexico  Tax on sugary drinks reduced consumption by 10% and increased the consumption of untaxed 
alternatives (milk and bottled water) by 7%. Consumer survey of 1,500 Mexicans reported that 
more than half of the sample reduced the consumption of sugary drinks since the tax was 
introduced (74).  
 In the first half of 2014, the biggest soft-drink bottler reported 6.4% reduction in sales while in the 
second half of 2014 the reduction slowed down to 0.3% (75).   
 Soft drink bottlers have registered a general fall in the volume of sales in North America, ranging 
from 0.1% to 3% across different companies (76).  
 The value of the soda market in Mexico is estimated to increase by 9.6% by 2019 from its current 
value of $15,935m (76). 
Source:(1, 2) unless stated otherwise. Ecorys report analysis based on Euromonitor Passport Database. 
The impact of taxes on foods appears to be less pronounced. In Denmark the 
increase in the price of fats, butter, margarine and oils due to the tax led to a 
reduction in consumption, albeit relatively small (table 4).  Over-shifting of the tax 
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was observed in discount stores and under-shifting in supermarkets (77). In 
Hungary, the consumption of salty snacks also decreased even though the tax was 
notably under-shifted and prices increased by less than expected. However, for 
confectionery, no changes in demand were observed, even though prices increased 
due to the tax. In Finland, the tax was over-shifted for confectionery and ice-cream 
but the larger than expected price increase led to only a small reduction in 
consumption (1, 2).  Reports of the effect of the Mexican tax, most recently, suggest 
reduction in the demand for confectionery and snacks.  
Some important substitution effects have been also reported. In Finland, the 
demand for untaxed products such as frozen desserts, breakfast bars, dairy-based 
desserts and yoghurts increased by 2-10% (1, 2). In Denmark, the demand for less 
taxed fats and oils (i.e. products with lower fat content) increased, but at a more 
broader level an increase in fibre intake was found, which resulted in an overall 
increase in energy intake and also a small increase in salt intake (77).  
Table 4 Impact of taxes on price and consumption of foods 
Country Impact 
Finland 
(confectionery 
and ice-cream)  
 The price of confectionery increased by 14.8% in 2011, 6% in 2012 and 3% in 2013.  
 The price of ice-cream increased by 15.7% in 2011, 4.9% in 2012 and by 2.9% in 2013. 
 Prices increased twice as much as can be attributed to the tax. 
 Demand for confectionery fell by 2.6% in 2011, 1.4% in 2012 and by 0.1% in 2013. 
 Demand for ice cream fell by 1.6% in 2011, 0.9% in 2012 and increased by 1.4% in 2013. 
 Demand increased for untaxed products (e.g. frozen desserts, breakfast bars) by 2-10%. 
 No visible impact on market shares of premium and non-premium brands. 
 Small increase in employment in confectionery production but decrease in productivity around 
the time of tax; decrease in value added of manufacturers directly after the tax; continuing 
increase in investments; no changes in margins. 
Denmark (butter, 
margarine, oils)  
 Prices increased by 12-17% for butter, margarine and cooking fats and 4-9% for less-taxed oils 
(e.g. olive and vegetable oils). 
 Demand for butter, margarine and cooking fats decreased by 5-8% and increased by 3-6% for less-
taxed oils. 
 Increase of market share of non-branded less-taxed oils. 
 Research suggests hoarding effects as purchases of saturated fats increased by 34% just before 
the tax and there was a total reduction in consumption by 5% just after the tax. Increase in total 
energy intake was observed due to higher intake of fibre. Small increase in salt intake. 
Supermarkets were found to under-shift the tax while discount stores over-shifted the tax. (77) 
Hungary 
(confectionery 
and salty snacks)  
Confectionery: 
 Price of sugar confectionery and chocolates increased by 9.9% and 10.6%, respectively in 2010-
2012. 
 Tax was expected to raise the price by 5.4% and 4.9%, respectively. 
 No changes in demand for confectionery were observed; demand for chocolates increased after 
tax but at a slower rate than in pre-tax period studied. 
 No changes in retail margins. 
 Tax coincided with slight decrease in employment in the industry. 
Salty snacks: 
 Prices increased by 6.3% in 2011, by 5.4% in 2012 and by 3.3% in 2013.  
 Tax was expected to rise the price by 18% (2011 and 2012 combined). 
 Demand decreased by 7.6% in 2011, 6.2% in 2012 and 0.6% in 2013. 
 Increase in the market share of non-premium brands both pre- and post-tax periods. 
Mexico (salty and 
sugary 
snacks/high-
caloric foods) 
 Initial reports showed no effect on sales (78). 
 Demand for confectionery has been estimated to have reduced by 5% as a response to 12% 
increase in its price (79). 
 Revenues of one of the largest bread and snack producers in Mexico fell by 1.5% in 2014 while the 
more affected companies were the medium-sized producers, with an average fall in sales of 
17%.(79) 
Source: (1, 2) unless stated otherwise. Ecorys report analysis based on Euromonitor Passport data. 
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6.2  Modelling studies in the UK 
Table 5 summarises the modelling studies using data from the UK to measure the 
impact of taxes on consumption and health. Earlier studies (rows 1-4) look at the 
impact of taxing saturated fats while the latest studies (rows 5-6) have shifted the 
focus on to SSBs. Research looking at the impact of broader taxes on sugar as a 
nutrient is yet to emerge.  
Table 5 Summary of the modelling studies of health related food and beverage taxes in the UK 
Study (year and data 
used) 
Intervention Impact on consumption Impact on 
revenue 
Impact on health 
1. Marshall (2000) 
(The Dietary and 
Nutritional Survey of 
British adults)(80) 
Extending VAT (17.5%) to 
principal sources of dietary 
saturated fats; exempting 
cholesterol neutral foods 
that are currently taxed 
(e.g. low fat frozen yoghurt) 
0.67% reduction in 
dietary calories from 
saturated fats. Includes 
hypothesised 
substitutions; all price 
elasticities hypothesised. 
Neutral (no 
estimates 
provided) 
Reduction in ischaemic 
heart disease by 1.8-
2.6%, preventing 
1,800-2,500 deaths 
per year 
2. Mytton et al. (2007) 
(National Food Survey 
2000; epidemiological 
data from meta-
analyses)(81) 
a. Taxing principal sources 
of dietary fat; 
b. Taxing unhealthy foods 
(SSCg3d model); 
c. Taxing foods in order to 
obtain the best health 
outcome. 
a. 3.2% increase in food 
expenditure  
and 2.2% increase in 
calories consumed 
b. 4%; -4.3% 
c. 4.6%; -6.4% 
observed increase in salt 
intake when saturated fat 
consumption fell 
Not 
estimated 
a. increase in CVD 
deaths by up to 3,500 
b. decrease in CVD 
deaths by up to 2,500 
c. decrease in CVD 
deaths by up to 3,200 
3.Nnoaham et al. 
(2009) 
(Expenditure and 
Food Survey 1988-
2000; epidemiological 
data from meta-
analyses)(82) 
a. Taxing principal sources 
of dietary fat; 
b. Taxing “less healthy 
foods” (WXYfm model); 
c. b + subsidising fruits and 
vegetables by 17.5%; 
d. b + using all tax revenue 
to subsidise fruit and 
vegetables. 
a. 5-8% increase in 
weekly food expenditure; 
0.55% reduction in 
calorie intake 
b. +5%; -2 to -3% 
c. +5%; -0.6 to -1.5% 
d. +5 to 6%; -0.2 to +0.7% 
increase in salt intake 
only in first scenario 
a. £5bn 
b. £18.3bn 
c. £10.6bn 
d. 0 
a. increase in total 
deaths (CHD, stroke, 
cancer) by up to 2,300 
b. Increase in total 
deaths by up to 1,300 
c. reduction in total 
deaths by up to 2,800 
d. reduction in total 
deaths by up to 6,400 
4. Tiffin and Arnoult 
(2011) 
(Expenditure and 
Food Survey 2005-06; 
four different sources 
providing risk ratio of 
disease associated 
with food intake)(83) 
Tax on saturated fats (1% 
increase for every 1% of 
saturated fat content with 
max 15%) in combination 
with subsidy on fruits and 
vegetables to offset tax 
Small reduction in total 
fat (SFA, MUFA) 
consumption; increase in 
fruit and veg intake (in 
line with recommended 
levels). Small increase in 
sugar and fibre intake; 
small reduction in sodium 
intake.  
Taxes and 
subsidies 
designed to 
yield 
revenue 
neutral 
outcome 
Small reduction in the 
odds ratio of being 
affected by CHD, 
gastric cancer, lung 
cancer, CVD, chronic 
disease, ischemic 
stroke. Odds ratios 
range from 1.02 to 
1.78 and the change 
from pre- to post-tax 
ranges from 2 to 6. 
5. Briggs et al. (2013) 
(Living Cost and Food 
Survey 2010, National 
Diet Nutrition Survey 
2008-10), Health 
Survey England and 
Scottish Health Survey 
2010)(84) 
A 20% tax on SSB Reduction in SSB 
consumption by 15-16%. 
Increase in milk (4%), 
juice (3%), diet drink (4-
8%), tea and coffee (4%), 
and water (4%) 
consumption. Reduction 
in daily energy intake by 
16.7 kJ 
£276m Number of obese 
people reduce by 1.3% 
(n=180 000); 
overweight by 0.9% 
(n=285 000);  
6. Tiffin et al. (2014) 
(Living Costs and Food 
Survey 2010, Kantar 
Worldpanel UK 2010-
11)(85) 
a.£0.06/L tax on regular and 
diet soft drinks and juice 
drinks with sweeteners (as 
in France);  
b.£0.02/L tax on the above 
listed drinks; 
c.£0.06/L tax on regular soft 
drinks and juice drinks with 
fruit content lower than 
25%; 
d.£0.02/L on regular soft 
drinks and juice drinks with 
sweeteners (as in Hungary). 
a.6.1% reduction in 
consumption of regular 
soft drinks and cola; 
0.02% reduction in 
energy intake  
b.2.3%, 0.008%  
c.4.3%, 0.014% 
d.1.4%, 0.005%  
Importance of 
substitution effects 
between beverages is 
noted. 
Not 
estimated   
Not estimated 
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It is evident that all proposed scenarios, regardless of the subject of the tax, yield 
relatively small changes in consumption behaviour and thus health. Nonetheless: 
a) Changes in the consumption of taxed products take place in the desired 
direction;  
b) The impact on overall energy intake varies because of substitution effects (see 
section 6.3) 
c) Taxes alone will result in an increase in government revenue, the level of which 
depends on the level of taxation, price of the taxed product, level of 
consumption and responsiveness of the consumption to changes in prices; 
d) Estimated health impact is relatively small where the impact on consumption is 
small and/or substitution effects undermine the impact of the tax on the overall 
energy intake; 
e) No study has attempted to measure the impact of gradual taxes, such as 
implemented in Finland, which are likely to lead to a more significant response 
from consumers, yielding also a higher health impact.  
 
6.3  What are the counter arguments to taxes? 
The ongoing debate has brought up various questions about the effectiveness of the 
taxes because of potential unintended effects. These often coincide with the 
arguments industry presents against food and beverage taxes (see also Box 1). 
Regressiveness of the tax 
Regressiveness of the tax on foods or beverages is one of the most frequent 
counter-arguments (86). If a tax is levied upon goods that low-income groups 
purchase and on which they therefore spend a greater share of their disposable 
income in comparison to higher-income groups, then the tax is regressive. However, 
this argument applies to all main consumer items that are taxed and that all 
population groups consume as low-income groups will always spend a relatively 
higher share of their income on taxes in comparison to high-income groups
13
. For 
example, the tariff on fruit and vegetables imported from outside the EU is also 
regressive. Thus, this is a bigger and a more fundamental issue across the whole 
taxation system. The government’s objective of wealth redistribution has to look at 
the tax and benefit system as a whole, rather than focus on a single tax (87). If a tax 
is regressive, government can use other sections of the system to compensate low-
income households (87), for example via income tax rates, tax credits or subsidies. 
The evidence from modelling studies in the UK demonstrates that a tax on its own 
(i.e. with no corresponding subsidies on healthy foods) will be regressive. The lowest 
income earners would have to increase expenditure the most if SSBs were taxed by 
20% (84). However, the differences between income thirds are relatively small 
(2.1%, 1.7% and 0.8%). The simulated impact of a tax on fats showed a small 
regressive effect. Rich and poor households were found to eat roughly similar 
amounts of fat but the poorest 2% of population were found to spend 0.7% of their 
income on the hypothesised tax while the richest were found to pay only 0.1% (88). 
Another important aspect in the debate on the regressive nature of the tax is the 
already existing unfair distribution of health which is partly driven by low-income 
earners eating an unhealthier diet (9) in comparison to wealthier counterparts,  as 
healthier diets are generally more expensive (42). Thus, larger health benefits might 
be seen among low-income groups as they are generally more responsive to price 
increases and have higher health risks associated due to greater consumption of 
unhealthy foods
14
.  However, this is more likely to happen if healthy foods become 
more affordable than they have been (10, 11). If markets fail to reduce the price of 
fresh and healthy foods, then revenue collected from unhealthy foods taxes could 
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 With the exception of luxury goods 
14
 Nnoaham et al. (2009) showed that in three of the four modelled scenarios, the health 
impact of taxes on fats and unhealthy foods is largest in the bottom income quintile. Briggs 
et al. (2013) showed an opposite effect where the impact of 20% SSB tax on energy intake 
and levels of obesity and overweight are highest in the highest income third. 
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be redistributed through subsiding fresh and healthy food to low-income groups. 
Existing programs, such as the Healthy Start program, which has been shown to be 
effective in increasing fruit and vegetable consumption among the voucher 
recipients, could be expanded (89). 
Substitution effects 
Substitution effects take place as the relative price of taxed and untaxed foods 
change. Some substitution effects are expected to enforce the tax (e.g. from regular 
to diet drinks), some may undermine it (e.g. from fats to carbohydrates or salt). 
Studies of hypothetical taxes provide some estimates of these effects but as 
consumers have different tastes and varying levels of access to available and 
affordable alternatives, the estimates based on retrospective expenditure data will 
always provide an average effect and thus only a crude approximation of real 
consumer behaviour patterns.  
Cross-price elasticities are either negative or positive. Negative cross-price elasticity 
indicates that a tax would reduce consumption of a substitute product, while a 
positive cross-price elasticity would indicate that a tax on the unhealthy product 
would trigger an increase in the consumption of the substitute product.  As the 
measured cross-price elasticities are relatively small and close to zero in value, a 
difference in the estimation methods or other bias can potentially cause a switch in 
the sign of the estimate from positive to negative which has a different 
interpretation (90). This is one of the explanations why different studies may find 
contradictive results regarding substitution effects in the same population (e.g. 
whether taxing soft drinks would reduce or increase consumption of snacks) (91, 92) 
and also it is a reason why prospective modelling studies are not able to provide 
robust estimates of the substitution effects.  
Uncertainty on whether tax will be fully passed through to consumers  
A tax on unhealthy foods and beverages can only be effective if it is passed on to 
consumers (i.e. the price increases by the amount of the tax). Whether or not this 
happens is dependent on various factors regarding how retailers expect consumers 
to react to taxes and profit margins. Taxes might be under-shifted if consumers are 
very price sensitive and it is less costly for the seller to reduce its own margins. 
However, if consumers are not as responsive to price changes or profit margins are 
tight, tax might be fully shifted to the consumers or even over-shifted by adding an 
increment to prices above the amount of the tax. Over-shifting is done to recover 
some of the lost revenue due to some decrease in demand. 
Bargaining power between retailers and manufacturers is also a factor that will 
affect shifting of the tax (1). In the UK, the food market is dominated by a small 
number of large companies and the response to a tax is likely to be a re-optimisation 
of prices, resulting in higher prices for some products and lower prices for others 
(87).  
This issue also refers to one of the weaknesses of the modelling studies as all of the 
studies assume a pass-through rate of 100%. Deviations from this have an impact on 
the predicted consumption and health outcomes. Over-shifting would reinforce the 
impact of the tax as price rises by more than tax alone while under-shifting would 
undermine the impact as price rises by less than intended. 
Reformulation  
Industry suggestions on how to tackle the crisis in diet-related health are mostly to 
improve consumer information (e.g. via labelling, education) and reformulation of 
products to contain less of specific ingredients or calories in more general. 
Introduction of taxes could further encourage or discourage product reformulation, 
depending on the type of tax imposed. Ingredient based taxes are more likely to 
lead to product reformulation than taxes based on products. For example, if a tax is 
imposed on SSBs regardless of whether it has 50% or 100% sugar, there is no 
incentive to reformulate the drink to include only 50% of sugars. If foods above 
certain level of sugar content are taxed, reformulation would be motivated provided 
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that the thresholds for the taxed ingredient are not tight (i.e. it is impossible to 
reduce the content of sugar to below a certain level).  
Political will  
Lack of support from current UK government towards a tax on SSBs or sugar is likely 
to reflect partially the failed attempt in 2012 to raise the VAT from 0% rate to a 
standard (20%) rate for cold take-away foods - the so called ‘pasty tax’
15
.   Those 
against the tax argued that the increase would negatively affect a large number of 
regular consumers and the industry, resulting in numerous job losses: such are the 
arguments recently used by the industry in opposition to raising taxes on SSBs (86, 
93). At the same time the Prime Minister and the Chancellor were both negatively 
portrayed in the press as being “out of touch with the ordinary people” (93) and 
eventually, the proposed tax increase was rejected in what was labelled as a 
‘political U-turn’. These events demonstrate that increasing taxes on foods or 
beverages is very difficult and requires careful preparation, design and 
communication.  
In Denmark, an analysis of the policy process surrounding the introduction and 
repeal of the tax on saturated fats concluded that politicians who initially supported 
the tax on saturated fats very quickly changed their minds as a reaction to criticisms 
by farmers, producers and retailers, without waiting for evidence of impact on 
demand and health. The repeal decision focused on revenue and economic effects 
and lacked a discussion on public health effects, while the introduction of the tax 
was heavily based on the health argument (52). It has also been noted that the tax 
had very few “wholehearted” supporters and many opponents, including among 
them nutrition experts (52). The analysis concluded that such taxes need to be 
politically supported for health rather than fiscal reasons and to be supported or at 
least accepted by prominent actors, including academic researchers (52). 
       Box 1: Main arguments used against taxes by the soft drinks industry 
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 Hot take-away food is subject to 20% VAT; the aim of the tax was not related to health but 
to simplify the tax treatment of take away foods as hot take-away food is currently subject 
to 20% VAT while cold take away food is taxed at 0% VAT. 
Tax is regressive and unfair* 
Most taxes on consumption are regressive because low-earning households pay a relatively higher proportion of their 
incomes on taxes. This applies to food and beverages as well. This should be addressed in the broader taxation system but 
could specifically be addressed also, for example, by redistributing the revenue from unhealthy food taxes through 
targeted voucher schemes for healthy foods.  
Tax destroys jobs and economic value*  
Claims regarding job losses are generally done from a narrow and specific industry perspective, rather than from the point 
of view of the whole economy. If taxes reduce the demand for certain foods, the money saved is likely to be spent on other 
foods, products, or services, creating more demand and thus more jobs and economic value. To date, no scientific and 
peer-reviewed analysis has been published documenting negative impacts on jobs and economic value associated with 
taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages. To the contrary, an analysis of the effect of existing taxes in the EU did not 
discover any significant or sustained impact on the competitiveness of the food and beverage industry from these taxes (1, 
2).  
Tax is unlikely to increase government revenue and taxation is ineffective* 
Effect on the consumption of taxed products (and health) and government revenue is in a reverse relation. If the effect on 
consumption is large (i.e. demand is elastic to price increase), the effect on revenue can be expected to be relatively 
smaller. If consumers do not respond to the price increase due to the tax, and have not reduced consumption considerably 
(i.e. demand is inelastic to price increase), it can be expected that revenues will be relatively larger. Hence, smaller 
revenues might mean that the health impact is larger. If the effect on consumption is small but yields larger tax revenues, it 
can provide additional funds for other programs targeting diet-related health. 
Tax is paternalistic/imposes a nanny-state 
There is a long history of taxing commodities, the consumption of which creates negative externalities, such as alcohol and 
tobacco.   
 
*Arguments are from fooddrinktax.eu which is a website dedicated to presenting facts on why food and drink taxes will not 
work, sponsored by UNESDA, representing the non-alcoholic beverage industry in Europe.  
  
17 Health-related taxes on food and beverages 
7.  Implications 
Evidence on the effectiveness of taxes to reduce consumption has been shown, 
particularly for SSBs. Arguably, the impact is small, but SSBs are relatively cheap 
products and the tax rates have been relatively small.  So far, taxes on foods high in 
sugar, fat and salt content have resulted in price increases, but change in demand 
for these foods has been more variable, reflecting perhaps a more complex market.  
The impact on consumption has so far only been analysed at a population level. It is 
possible that effects have been greater across different sub-populations such as 
high and low demand consumers. 
The impact of existing taxes on health has not yet been established but it is likely to 
be small because the impact on consumption has been small. The potential of these 
taxes to collect revenue for the government has also been shown. One effect that 
has not been measured for any of the existing taxes is their ability to convey a health 
message that in the long-run contributes to a reduction in the consumption of taxed 
products.  
It is beyond doubt that the food environment in the UK needs to change to support 
healthier diets to improve diet-related health. This means that healthy foods and 
beverages have to become cheaper relative to unhealthy foods and beverages. 
There are a number of different policies that can help in achieving this and taxing 
unhealthy products is one of these. However, in order for the tax to be effective it 
needs to be sufficiently large and incentivise a switch to healthier alternatives. 
Crucially, it needs to have support from key actors and convey the message that it is 
introduced on grounds of improving the health of the population.  
Introducing taxes in conjunction with other relevant policies and measures (e.g. 
consumer education, subsidy programs, improved labelling, reformulation and 
restrictions on marketing and promotion practices) is equally crucial. Otherwise 
taxes can become a “silver bullet” solution slowing industry and the Government 
from taking further steps and measures that are needed to address diet-related 
health in the UK.  
If taxes are to be pursued to achieve changes in consumer behaviour, tax rates have 
to be sufficiently high as food products individually are relatively cheap. 
Furthermore, the tax base needs to be well thought through to avoid substitution 
towards untaxed but equally unhealthy alternatives. To reduce regressiveness of the 
tax, targeted subsidies for low-income households for healthy and fresh foods could 
be introduced. Health effects are also likely to be higher if collected tax revenue is 
allocated to nutrition related health programs and policies.  
While the current evidence is mounting, there are still considerable gaps in the 
knowledge and uncertainty surrounding the impact of such taxes. Thus, current 
taxes in Europe and elsewhere need to be evaluated in the longer run for sustained 
effects on consumption and resulting changes in health outcomes. Importantly, 
more work needs to be done in order to establish opinion and support from the 
public. At a broader level, efforts should continue to better understand our 
relationship with food – why we consume what we consume and how we consume 
it - to provide future policy solutions. 
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Taxes on unhealthy foods or beverages  
 A well designed tax is likely to increase the price of the product tax is levied upon  
 Price increase on unhealthy food or beverages will reduce its consumption: the degree of change 
depends on consumer responsiveness to modifications in prices of taxed food and beverages. 
 Taxes will raise revenue: the amount will depend on the tax base, the rate and consumer 
responsiveness to changes in prices. 
 If well communicated, taxes can help convey a message on the harmfulness of overconsumption 
of the taxed foods/beverages. 
 Taxes on unhealthy foods or beverages alone will not improve health significantly, but they are a 
complementary measure to a wider food policy strategy aimed at improving the food 
environment, encouraging healthy lifestyles, and thereby impacting on the obesity epidemic. 
 Taxing unhealthy food and beverages is not an easy measure to adopt, as it has been, and will 
continue to be, strongly opposed by the food industry.   
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